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A tableau is a refutation-based decision procedure for a related logic, and is among the
most popular proof procedures for modal logics. In this paper, we present a labelled
tableau calculus for a temporalised belief logic called TML+, which is obtained by adding
a linear-time temporal logic onto a belief logic by the temporalisation method of Finger
and Gabbay. We ﬁrst establish the soundness and the completeness of the labelled tableau
calculus based on the soundness and completeness results of its constituent logics. We
then sketch a resolution-type proof procedure that complements the tableau calculus and
also propose a model checking algorithm for TML+ based on the recent results for model
checking procedures for temporalised logics. TML+ is suitable for formalising trust and
agent beliefs and reasoning about their evolution for agent-based systems. Based on the
logic TML+, the proposed labelled tableau calculus could be used for analysis, design and
veriﬁcation of agent-based systems operating in dynamic environments.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Multi-agent systems (MAS) consist of a collection of agents that may interact with one another to fulﬁll their design
objectives in dynamic, complex, and often uncertain, environments. For agent communication to lead to a successful out-
come in such systems, the agents need to believe that they are communicating with each other, not with intruders posing
as other agents in the system. Many researchers have attempted to capture such beliefs using formal frameworks to enable
automated reasoning about certain properties of security for communication systems. In a landmark paper, Burrows et al.
[10] proposed a logic called BAN to describe agent beliefs involved in authentication protocols and reason about them. In
order to overcome the limitations of the BAN logic which have surfaced over the years, several researchers have developed
extensions of the BAN logic, such as GNY logic [20], VO logic [48] and SVO logic [46]. A recent proposal by Wen et al. [49]
discusses the functions of the BAN logic in the formalization of authentication protocols, explores its shortcomings, and
suggests some methods for improvement. More recently, Teepe [47] exposed an unjustiﬁable inference rule in the BAN logic
that may lead to unsound conclusions for a simple communication protocol. Despite such recent results, belief logics such
as BAN still provide a sound formal basis for reasoning about agent beliefs in particular environments and systems based
on certain assumptions.
The formalisms discussed above and many others have been successfully used for dealing with various aspects of agent-
based systems, but they generally overlook some other aspects such as dynamics of trust [24]. For example, using the modal
approach to modelling beliefs, the assertion that “Alice believes that Bob is honest (or trustworthy)” can be formalised by
the proposition BAlice honest(Bob) where BAlice is the modal belief operator for agent Alice. However, trust changes (as time
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longer trustworthy based on some negative experience with him and the proposition is no longer valid. Any framework for
modelling trust will therefore require the management of the evolution of trust.
Blaze et al. [7] ﬁrst identiﬁed the trust management problem as a distinct and important component of security for
communication systems. They proposed an approach to trust management and described a prototype implementation of a
trust management system called PolicyMaker that facilitates the development of security features in a wide range of net-
work services. Further discussions of trust management engines, including PolicyMaker and KeyNote, have appeared in their
continuing work [8,9]. On trust management, Winslett’s group [50,52] proposed an approach to automated trust negotiation
and discussed both the theoretical and the system issues that are raised by the approach. In parallel to these developments,
it has also been suggested that the existing methods and techniques of belief revision could be helpful in revision of trust
theories [33,43]. Question still remains as to how to capture the evolution of trust directly within the theory itself. After
many years of intense research on trust management, many studies have pointed out that in order to capture the evolution
of trust in a trust theory, we need to consider a formalism that is not only capable of expressing agent beliefs but also
how they change over time. This naturally leads us to logics suitable for representing temporal properties, that is, temporal
logics, in combination with another logic appropriate for representing agent beliefs.
Temporal logic is a well developed and extensively studied formal system for reasoning about complex dynamic systems
involving time [19]. Temporal logics have been used successfully in many areas such as program veriﬁcation, modelling
concurrent computations, and specifying communication protocols. Several recent studies have proposed approaches based
on temporal and epistemic logics to model knowledge of agents for analysing security protocols. To mention a few of
those approaches, Lomuscio and Woz´na [32] proposed a temporal epistemic logic for the analysis of a stream authentication
protocol (called Tesla [42]), and provided a sound and complete axiomatisation for the logic. Su et al. [45] proposed a multi-
modal logic of knowledge, belief, desire and intention for modelling agent-based systems and developed a model checker
for the logic based on NuSMV [11]. There have been many other proposals for multi-modal logics based on mostly ad hoc
combinations of some notions such as beliefs, knowledge, obligations and time, based on a chosen application domain.
Furthermore, it has also been argued that any logical system used for modelling agent-based systems should be a combined
system of logics of belief, intentions, knowledge, norms, obligations and time since these are among the basic concepts to
model and reason about [17]. The same argument has been made for knowledge representation where fuzzy, probabilistic
or spatial reasoning may need to be combined as well [44]. The critical issue for us is how to introduce the notion of time
into a suitable logic for modelling the evolution of agent beliefs in a systematic way.
This issue has been addressed by proposals of several important methods for combining logics such as ﬁbring [17],
fusion [25], products [18] and temporalisation [14]. These proposals have led to the development of speciﬁc combined
logics for diverse applications in artiﬁcial intelligence and software engineering. For instance, Dixon et al. [12] considered a
temporal epistemic logic resulting from the fusion of linear-time temporal logic and multi-modal S5. Fusion is a simple and
conservative way of combining logics whereby the modal notions of the component logics do not interact with one another.
Orgun et al. [30] proposed a temporalised belief logic called TML+ for reasoning about dynamics of trust in agent-based
systems. Temporalisation is a method for combining logics whereby a temporal logic can be added on top of another given
logic system to create a new logic system with temporal features. Later, Orgun et al. [41] also proposed an expressive logic
combining a temporal logic with a belief logic using ﬁbring for reasoning about stream authentication protocols such as
Tesla. Such systematic combinations of logics may lead to more expressive formalisms than any single logic and could shed
light on how typical assumptions relating to agent beliefs can be speciﬁed and reasoned about.
In this paper, we consolidate the works on the temporalised belief logic TML+ by presenting the theoretical foundations
of a labelled tableau calculus for the logic. Speciﬁc reasoning techniques for agent-based systems based on the tableau
have been discussed elsewhere [34,36]. The logic TML+ is obtained by combining a belief logic called TML with a temporal
logic called SLTL using the temporalising technique of Finger and Gabbay [14] in which SLTL is added on top of TML. SLTL
has been used for specifying events that may run on different clocks of varying rates of progress, such as those found
in distributed and/or reactive systems [28], and also for representing and reasoning about such events stored in temporal
knowledge bases [40]. TML is a multi-modal variant of the modal logic KD and it extends ﬁrst-order logic with typed
variables and belief operators for agents [27]. We in particular establish the soundness and completeness of the labelled
tableau calculus for TML+ . Tableau systems naturally have certain advantages over axiomatic and/or clausal resolution-based
systems and they align very well with Kripke semantics for modal logics. Equipped with a suitable tableau system, TML+
can be applied for reasoning about time-dependent properties regarding trust and agent beliefs.
We may also combine TML and SLTL using another method to obtain a logic with a different expressive capability for
different kinds of applications. For instance, it has been shown that the ﬁbring of TML and SLTL may lead to a combined logic
in which the temporal and modal operators can be applied without any restrictions [31,41]. However, ﬁbring is in general a
much more complex combination technique than temporalisation, and, as we have demonstrated in our earlier work [35,36],
temporalised logics are usually expressive enough for the speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of security protocols. Moreover,
a recent work by Franceschet et al. [16] proposed a model checking procedure which could be used to develop model
checkers for temporalised logics based on the model checking procedures for the component logics. By taking advantage of
their work, we also provide a model checking algorithm for the temporalised belief logic TML+ to complement the tableau
calculus.
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formal background for TML, SLTL and the temporal belief logic TML+ together with its axiomatisation. Section 4 presents
the labelled tableau system for TML+ and proves its soundness and completeness, and also sketches a clausal resolution
method which can also be used along with the tableau system. Section 5 discusses how to specify and reason about agent
beliefs involved in the trust theories of communication protocols using the labelled tableau system. Section 6 outlines an
algorithm for the model checking procedure for TML+ . Section 7 concludes the paper with a brief summary and discusses
several future research directions.
2. Trust and belief
For completeness, we discuss the notions of trust and belief as they impact on the choice of the temporalised belief
logic. Most of the discussion given below is summarised from [39].
We view a secure digital communication environment (e.g., the Internet) as a large complex system consisting of a
number of agents (that is, a multi-agent system). The agents in such a system are usually many and diverse: an agent
can be a person, a computer, a software program, a sensor, a hand-held device such as PDA or some other entity. Agent
interactions are unavoidable and also necessary in many applications. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the notion of
trust is essential for understanding the interactions between agents [51]. To be more precise, agents need to trust others in
certain respects if they are to have conﬁdence that such interactions will lead to a desirable outcome.
There is no consensus deﬁnition of trust in the literature, however, there are many works addressing the notion of trust
in much limited contexts such as authentication, authorization, access control policy and so on. A notable deﬁnition of trust
is given by Grandison and Sloman [22]: “Trust is the ﬁrm belief in the competence of an entity to act dependably, securely
and reliably with a speciﬁed context.” We take the context to be a secure digital communication environment and the agents
are the computer systems or software agents operating in such an environment. When an agent receives a message from
another agent, it has to decide whether to believe that this message is reliable. From the agent’s perspective, the reliability
of the message may depend on the trust that the agent places in the communication infrastructure and policies/protocols
that govern it.
There are in general no agreed methods or tools that can be used for the speciﬁcation of and reasoning about trust and
agent beliefs for a secure digital communication environment such as the Internet [22]. For this reason, may researchers have
proposed formal approaches and/or theoretical frameworks for encapsulating the notion of trust. Such formal approaches
could assist the system developers and/or security architects in the design and deployment of secure communication sys-
tems and in the veriﬁcation of whether such systems meet their intended security goals.
In discussing formal descriptions of trust, we need to observe the following features within the notion of trust [29,39]:
• In general, there is no global trust in a secure digital communication environment. In other words, there do not exist
some agents who can be trusted by all the other agents. This is especially so in highly dynamic and uncertain environ-
ments such as mobile systems or sensor systems. Moreover, trust depends on the observer (agent); two different agents
will not necessarily equally trust some received information.
• The trust of an agent can change over time depending on personal experience or by other agents’ recommendation. For
example, up to now, agent A has trusted agent B , but A has just found that B lied to A or some other trusted agents
have reported that B lied to them, so, from now on, A may decide it longer trusts B .
• There is no full trust in the sense that one agent believes everything another agent says. With the limited and often
incomplete information available to an agent, it cannot in general trust all of the statements provided by another agent.
So, a limited, context-dependent trust model may be employed, where “agent A trusts agent B” means that A will only
trust B on certain topics.
• A trust relation is not necessarily transitive or symmetric. Given that agent A trusts agent B and agent B trusts agent C ,
we cannot in general conclude that agent A would also trust agent C because agent B does. Also, if agent A trusts
agent B , it does not mean that agent B would also trust A.
Let us consider a scenario (taken from [39]) of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) which manages digital certiﬁcates. Each
agent is assigned a public key by a trusted third party (certiﬁcate authority). Suppose that agent Alice wants to communicate
securely with agent Bob, then Alice has to obtain Bob’s public key ﬁrst. The PKI provides a mechanism for agents to retrieve
the required certiﬁcates, so, Alice can retrieve any certiﬁcate she requires. Once Alice has retrieved Bob’s certiﬁcate, in which
Bob’s public key is bound, she has to determine the validity of the certiﬁcate. In fact, Alice will not be prepared to use Bob’s
certiﬁcate unless she can prove its validity from her own beliefs by making use of some assumptions about the security
mechanisms of the system. If Alice believes in the validity of the certiﬁcate (in other words, she believes that the certiﬁcate
can be trusted), then she may use the public key in Bob’s certiﬁcate to send messages to Bob securely. In our approach, the
assumptions about the security mechanisms of the system will be encapsulated in a trust theory.
From the above analysis, we may see that reasoning about trust actually involves reasoning about beliefs. Therefore,
a theory of trust may be based on a logic that possesses the ability to represent beliefs, which brings us back to the modal
logic approach which is able to enhance propositional and ﬁrst-order logics with modal operators to represent agents’ beliefs
directly. Furthermore, trust may evolve over time as the outcome of a series of conﬁrming observations [13]. In the above
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to consider a formalism that is not only capable of expressing agent beliefs but also how beliefs change over time [33]. This
discussion leads us to temporalised belief logics such as TML+ .
3. Temporalised belief logic
This section provides the background on the Temporalised Belief Logic TML+ and its constituent logics (namely Typed
Modal Logic (TML) and Simple Linear-Time Temporal Logic (SLTL)). Since TML+ is obtained by using temporalisation, the
temporal operators of SLTL are not allowed to appear within the scope of the modal belief operators of TML. This means
that TML+ is suitable for reasoning about agent beliefs that vary through time but not about beliefs of agents about time-
varying properties. This section consolidates the results presented in a series of papers elsewhere [30,39,34,36].
3.1. SLTL
SLTL is a linear-time logic based on the set of natural numbers as the underlying (global) timeline. The authentication
protocols we have studied are based on a model where an initial message communication is followed by further commu-
nication taking place at some later (but not necessarily consecutive) steps. Those steps correspond to discrete moments in
time deﬁned over a subset of the global timeline (that is, a local clock). The operators of SLTL are such that they allow for
the representation of an initial communication by reference to the start of time on the local clock, followed by reference
to the successive points in time on the same local clock. The corresponding temporal operators in SLTL are ﬁrst and next,
which refer to the initial moment and the next moment in time on a given clock respectively.
The syntax of SLTL formulas are deﬁned in the usual way for a temporal logic, in particular, if φ is a formula of SLTL, so
are ﬁrst φ and next φ. In SLTL, the underlying collection of moments in time is the set of natural numbers with its usual
ordering relation <. The global clock is simply deﬁned as the increasing sequence of natural numbers. The semantics of
SLTL formulas is deﬁned with respect to given local clocks (inﬁnite subsequences of a global clock); no clock is allowed to
be ﬁnite.
A time model for the logic SLTL has the form Msltl = 〈ck,<,π〉, where ck = 〈t0, t1, t2, . . .〉 is a local clock, < is the usual
ordering relation over the moments in ck, and π is an assignment function that gives a value π(t, p) ∈ {true, false} for any
time point t in ck and any atomic formula p. The assignment function π interprets all the terms given in atomic formula p
in a standard way.
The semantics of SLTL formulas is then deﬁned in the standard way for a propositional temporal logic, in particular,
Msltl, ti | p iff π(ti, p) = true for an atomic formula p. Below we only give the semantics of the temporal operators of
SLTL:
• Msltl, ti | ﬁrst p iff Msltl, t0 | p.
• Msltl, ti | next p iff Msltl, ti+1 | p.
Although SLTL is a relatively simple temporal logic, it has certain features that make it easy to reason about properties
that hold at speciﬁc moments in time. For example, suppose that a property represented by formula ϕ is true at time
tn on a given local clock. We can refer to the property by nested applications of ﬁrst and next as follows: ﬁrstnextn ϕ
where nextn is the n-folded application of next. We have also found this feature quite useful in the formalization of certain
properties in authentication protocols such as those that state something occurred at a speciﬁc point in time [35,36].
3.2. TML
Again, TML is a multi-modal variant of the modal logic KD in which each agent has an associated belief operator, for
instance, the belief operator, BBob , is intended to denote “Bob believes that”. In the literature, most of the works use the
modal logic of KD45 for agent beliefs which can support positive and negative introspection [23]. However, there are quite
a few works in the literature which use modal logics weaker than KD45 for modelling certain desired aspects of beliefs. For
example, Banerjee and Dubois [5] proposed a belief logic called MEL which is also a fragment of KD. MEL is more restrictive
than TML in that nested belief modalities are not allowed in the logic, however, it is able to model agent beliefs as they are
revealed through communication between agents. Similarly, we restrict ourselves to a multi-modal variant of KD because
we have found that it is suﬃcient for representing the basic notions in the authentication (and communication) protocols
we have studied [35,36], such as a message has been received from another agent, the message is believed to be reliable
and/or authenticated. The protocols do not require any special condition for agent beliefs, other than the requirement that
the agents are rational. However, in contrast to MEL, TML does not rule out introspective assertions (such as BBobBBobϕ)
when these assertions are warranted by the models of a given authentication protocol, but they are not inferred from the
beliefs of an agent by introspection rules.
The syntax of TML formulas are deﬁned in the usual way for a typed ﬁrst-order modal logic. In particular, the domain
objects (values) are classiﬁed into types and each term can only have values of a certain type (e.g., agents, messages). Let us
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formula ϕ of TML, Biϕ is also a formula.
As in SLTL, the semantics of TML is deﬁned in the standard way for a ﬁrst-order modal logic in terms of Kripke structures,
but over constant domains and rigid designators [15]. A classical Kripke model [26] for TML is deﬁned as a tuple Mtml =
〈S, R1, . . . , Rn,π〉, where S is the set of states or possible worlds; and each Ri , i = 1, . . . ,n, is the possibility relation of the
KD-type according to agent i. Ri is a nonempty set consisting of state pairs (s, t) such that (s, t) ∈ Ri iff at state s, agent
i considers the state t possible; and π is the assignment function, which gives a value π(s, p) ∈ {true, false} for any s ∈ S
and any formula p. Again, the assignment function π interprets all the terms given in atomic formula p in a standard way.
Formula ϕ is satisﬁable in the model Mtml if there exists s ∈ S such that π(t,ϕ) = true.
Below we only give the semantics of the belief operators of TML:
• Mtml, s | Bi ϕ iff for all t , (s, t) ∈ Ri , Mtml, t | ϕ .
3.3. Temporalising TML
Temporalised logics can be used to describe dynamic processes, and their behaviour is characterised by logical formal-
ization. Although TML+ has its limitations, it is still able to obtain an appropriate semantics for reasoning about processes
of most authentication systems. In our research we focus on formal models for the behaviour of compositional (temporal
and beliefs) systems. TML+ is suitable to build formal models of dynamics; protocols are described by temporal models that
satisfy some set of temporal axioms.
In TML+ , there are two classes of modal operators: (1) the belief operators originating from TML; and (2) the temporal
operators originating from SLTL. Since TML+ is obtained by temporalisation, which is a hierarchy combination technique for
combining logics, the temporal operators ﬁrst and next can never appear within the scope of a belief operator. Therefore
the sentence ﬁrst BAlice honest(Bob) is a TML
+ formula, but BAlice ﬁrst honest(Bob) is not. Note that both the sentences
would be allowed if the two logics TML and SLTL were ﬁbred as in [41].
For combining TML and SLTL by temporalisation, we ﬁrst stipulate that both of the logics share the same vocabulary
(predicates, function symbols and variables). Let Ltml represent the set of all formulas in TML. We divide Ltml into two
sets, L (b)tml and L
(m)
tml . We assume that L
(b)
tml ∩ L (m)tml = ∅. The set L (b)tml consists of all formulas with Boolean connectives,
and the set L (m)tml consists of all the monolithic formulas. The set L
(m)
tml is deﬁned as follows:
1. ϕ ∈L (m)tml , if ϕ is an atomic formula in Ltml .
2. Bi ϕ ∈ L (m)tml , for all i (1  i  n), if ϕ ∈ L (m)tml . This means that we allow formulas of type BiB j ϕ with an arbitrary
nesting of belief operators.
3. If ϕ(X) ∈L (m)tml , where X is a free variable, then ∀Xϕ(X) ∈L (m)tml .
Let Ltml+ be the set of formulas of TML
+ . Then Ltml+ is deﬁned as follows:
1. If ϕ ∈L (m)tml , then ϕ ∈Ltml+ .
2. If ϕ ∈Ltml+ and ψ ∈Ltml+ , then ¬ϕ ∈Ltml+ and (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈Ltml+ .
3. If ϕ ∈Ltml+ , then ﬁrst ϕ ∈Ltml+ and next ϕ ∈Ltml+ .
The temporalisation method [14] combines the semantics of the constituent logics using a mapping that associates each
moment in time with a classical Kripke model in such a way that any formula of TML+ is interpreted in its proper context.
The meaning of a TML+ formula involves a time model and a time reference initially.
Let K + be a class of models of the logic TML of the form Mtml = 〈S, R1, . . . , Rn,π,U 〉, where U represents the col-
lection of the current world(s) from which the observation is made [14]. This representation of the current world(s) also
allows for the case where there is uncertainty as to which exact world the agents think they are at. Consider a time frame
(ck,<), where ck = 〈t0, t1, t2, . . .〉, and a function v : ck →K + , mapping moments in time on the clock ck to a model in
the class K + . A model of TML+ is a quadruple 〈ck,K +,<, v〉, denoted by Mtml+ .
The semantics of TML+ formulas are given as follows:
1. Mtml+ , ti | ϕ , ϕ ∈L (m)tml , iff v(ti) =Mtml and Mtml, s | ϕ for all s ∈ U .
2. Mtml+ , ti | ¬ϕ , iff Mtml+ , ti | ϕ .
3. Mtml+ , ti | ϕ ∧ ψ , iff Mtml+ , ti | ϕ and Mtml+ , ti | ψ .
4. Mtml+ , ti | ﬁrst ϕ , iff Mtml+ , t0 | φ.
5. Mtml+ , ti | next ϕ , iff Mtml+ , ti+1 | ϕ .
Let the symbol  denote any modal or temporal operator of TML+ . The axioms of TML+ are given as follows:
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A1. (ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ).
A2. (ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ (ϕ) ∧ (ψ).
A3. ∀X(Bi ϕ(X)) ↔ Bi (∀Xϕ(X)), for all i (1 i  n).
A4. Bi (¬ϕ) → ¬(Bi ϕ).
A5. ﬁrst (¬ϕ) ↔ ¬(ﬁrst ϕ).
A6. next (¬ϕ) ↔ ¬(next ϕ).
A7. ﬁrst (ﬁrst ϕ) ↔ ﬁrst ϕ .
A8. next (ﬁrst ϕ) ↔ ﬁrst ϕ .
The rules of inference of the logic TML+ include:
IR1.




















only if ϕ does not have any temporal operators. (Belief Necessitation)
The soundness of the logic TML+ depends on the soundness theorems for TML and SLTL [27,28]. The completeness of
TML+ can be proved by the techniques used in [14].
4. Labelled analytic tableau for TML+
There have been many semantic tableau systems proposed in the literature for various modal and temporal logics [21,
15,38,1]. A tableau system is a refutation method that systematically tries to build a countermodel for the negation of a
formula. To prove that a formula ϕ holds, we start with the negation of the formula ¬ϕ and apply a set of rules to build a
closed tableau (tree) where all branches are closed. A branch is closed if it contains a formula ϕ and its negation (¬ϕ), or
(false) or (not true). A closed tableau for ¬ϕ means that no countermodel to the original formula ϕ can be constructed.
In this section, we present a labelled analytic tableau calculus for TML+ based on KEM, a labelled modal tableau system
proposed by Governatori [21,2], which is a very suitable method for providing tableau calculus for combined systems of
logics. In [41], KEM has also been adopted for providing a tableau calculus for the ﬁbred logic of FL (the combination of
SLTL and TML by ﬁbring). We directly borrow from these works for the development of the tableau calculus for TML+ while
introducing a simpliﬁed label uniﬁcation method to cater for the restricted label structures in TML+ .
4.1. Inference rules
In the tableau system, every formula is assigned a label and the label represents the possible worlds at which the formula
is true. We adopt the label deﬁnition of Artosi et al. [3]. Let C = {w1,w2,w3, . . .} be a set of constant world symbols, and
V = {W1,W2,W3, . . .} a set of world variables. We ﬁrst deﬁne the notion of a path deﬁned over C and V inductively as
follows:
(i) given x, y ∈ C ∪ V , (x, y) is a path, and
(ii) given x ∈ C ∪ V and a path y, (x, y) is a path.
Then the set of labels W consists of all the elements of C ∪ V and all the paths. Intuitively each wi represents a speciﬁc
world in a Kripke model whereas each Wi represents a set of worlds. A path (xn, (xn−1, (. . . , (x1, x0) . . .))) originates from a
world represented by x0 and captures the set of possible worlds accessible from that world represented by xn .
The nodes on a branch in a given tableau are in the form ϕ : W , where ϕ is a formula of the logic and W is a label as
deﬁned above. The interpretation of ϕ : W is that formula ϕ is true at world W . For example, suppose we have ϕ ∧ ψ : W
at a node on a branch in a tableau. Intuitively, this means that the formula ϕ ∧ ψ is true at the world W . Since, by the
semantics of ∧, both ϕ and ψ are true at W , we can infer both ϕ : W and ψ : W . Again, we use wi ∈ C to denote a speciﬁc
possible word, and Wi ∈ V to denote any possible world.
The following inference rules for the labelled tableau calculus for TML+ are mainly adopted from [21,41].
The conjunctive rules generate two new nodes on any given branch.


























ϕ → ψ : W
ψ → ϕ : W
(C)
The disjunctive rules generate two new branches from the given node.
ϕ ∨ ψ : W
ϕ : W | ψ : W
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) : W
¬ϕ : W | ¬ψ : W
ϕ → ψ : W
¬ϕ : W | ψ : W
¬(ϕ ↔ ψ) : W
¬(ϕ → ψ) : W | ¬(ψ → ϕ) : W (D)
The double negation elimination rule works for any labelled formula.
¬¬ϕ : W
ϕ : W (DN)
For quantiﬁer rules, we assume that the domains are rigid and nonempty. In these quantiﬁer rules, s is any ﬁrst-order term








¬ϕ(c) : W (Q)
The substitution rule (Modus Ponens) generates one new node from two premises that occur on any given branch: if
ϕ → ψ : W and ϕ : W both occur on a tableau branch, then we can infer the formula ψ : W .
ϕ → ψ : W , ϕ : W
ψ : W (S)
In the following, we present the rules for the temporal operators.
ﬁrstϕ : W
ϕ : (t0,W )
¬ﬁrstϕ : W
¬ϕ : (t0,W )
nextϕ : W
ϕ : (tn,W )
¬nextϕ : W
¬ϕ : (tn,W ) (T)
Note that the accessibility relation for ﬁrst is functional, and it always refers to the origin of time represented by t0.
Therefore if ﬁrst ϕ is true at any world W , then ϕ is true at t0. Similarly, the accessibility relation for next is also functional.
Since W is assumed to represent an arbitrary world including an arbitrary moment in time, we can refer to (tn,W ) as the
next moment in time. So, if next ϕ is true at W , then ϕ is true at the world tn accessible from W where tn is a fresh time
variable or constant.
We now present the rules for the belief operators.
Baφ : W
φ : (Wai ,W )
¬Baφ : W
¬φ : (wai ,W )
(B)
The path (Wai ,W ) represents the worlds accessible via Ra from W where W
a
i ∈ V and Ra is the accessibility relation
associated with agent a whereas the path (wai ,W ) represents some world accessible via Ra from W where w
a
i ∈ C .
In TML+ , any given formula ϕ is either true or false in any given world. The bivalence rule (BV) given below captures
this notion and allows us to create two new branches along any branch whenever we wish in a tableau proof.
ϕ : W | ¬ϕ : W (BV)
In order to close branches of a given tableau proof, we need to ﬁnd two complementary formulas on the nodes along
a given branch (i.e., a formula and its negation). We also need to make sure that their labels are also complementary (i.e.,
they may represent the same world(s)). Recall that the labels in W are terms built up from constant world symbols in C ,
world variables in V and a path construction mechanism between worlds. In other words, they are just like ﬁrst-order terms
where the path construction mechanism is a two-place function symbol, therefore, the label uniﬁcation method for TML+
(denoted by σTML+ ) can be developed based on standard uniﬁcation of ﬁrst-order terms but under special constraints of the
label structures (see the next subsection for details).
The following rule then says that two labelled formulas are complementary when the formulas themselves can be uni-
ﬁed according to the standard uniﬁcation for ﬁrst-order terms and that their labels u and v unify according to the label
uniﬁcation method σTML+ .
ϕ(x) : u,¬ϕ(y) : v
× (U)
When a branch reaches a node with × (representing a contradiction), then we say that the branch is closed. The closure of
a node with × leads to the closure for all the branches that the node could have; this is because all those branches would
also have the same contradiction that led to the closure of the node in the ﬁrst place.
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Recently, Orgun et al. [41] introduced a label uniﬁcation method for a logic called FL which is obtained by combining
TML and SLTL using ﬁbring. They have also developed label uniﬁcation methods for TML and SLTL and used them in the
development of the label uniﬁcation method for FL. In the ﬁbred logic FL, label uniﬁcation is more complicated than that in
TML+ because there are no restrictions on the way in which belief operators and temporal operators can appear in a given
formula. The given labels can be extended by the rules for modal/temporal operators, resulting in arbitrary interleaving of
segments of time labels and world labels. In TML+ , the labels are always arranged in two distinct segments, a world label
and a time label, and the segments can be only in that order. Therefore a simpliﬁed label uniﬁcation method for TML+ can
be developed based on the label uniﬁcations σSLTL and σTML for SLTL and TML respectively.
Recall that the labels in W are terms built up from constant world symbols in C , world variables in V and a path con-
struction mechanism between worlds. We ﬁrst partition C into two distinct subsets of CT and CB where C = CT ∪ CB ; here
CT consists of the constant worlds representing exact time points whereas CB consists of the constant worlds representing
exact possible worlds. We also partition V into V T and V B in a similar fashion.
We deﬁne the following function split(u) = [w, t] to split a given u ∈W into its world and time labels as follows:
• split(u) = [( ),u] where u ∈ CT ∪ V .
• split((x, y)) = [( ), (x, y)] where u = (x, y), x ∈ CT ∪ VT .
• split((x, y)) = [(x, x′), y′] where u = (x, y), x ∈ CB ∪ V B , split(y) = [x′, y′].
The split point is marked with ( ) as part of the world label which means that all the world labels will be of the form
(. . . , ( ) . . .), for example, splitting the label (W2, (W1, t0)) will yield [(W2, (W1, ( ))), t0]. However, this does not create any
problems for the subsequent uniﬁcation.
Given the label uniﬁcations σSLTL and σTML , the label uniﬁcation σTML+ is deﬁned as follows: The notation [u, v]ρσTML+
means that u and v can be uniﬁed under σTML+ with the most general uniﬁer ρ (that is, uρ = vρ). Then
[u, v]ρσTML+ iff [wu,wv ]
ρw
σTML and [tu, tv ]ρtσSLTL
where split(u) = [wu, tu], split(v) = [wv , tv ], and ρ = ρw ∪ ρt .
Note that SLTL can be considered as the combination of the logic of ﬁrst with the logic of next, which means that σSLTL is
actually obtained by combining the label uniﬁcations of the two logics. Similarly, TML can be considered as the combination
of multiple KD logics (one for each agent a). So, σTML is also obtained by combining the label uniﬁcations of all the agent
logics. We refer the reader to [41] for the technical details.
4.3. Logical consequence
Logical consequence is the relation that holds between a set of formulas and a formula. We write
G |TML+ A ⇒ ϕ
to denote that formula ϕ is derived from G and U , where G is a set of global assumptions, and U is a set of local assump-
tions, and formula ϕ is a logical consequence that follows from G and A. Global assumptions are applied for any world,
while a local assumption is applied for a speciﬁc world. The intuition behind local assumptions is that they formalize cer-
tain, speciﬁc statements such as the reception of a message by an agent at a particular time or the belief of an agent in the
reliability of another agent at some particular world.




ϕ : w (A)
where W ∈ V is a variable representing any world, and w ∈ C is a constant representing a speciﬁc world.
A formula ξ is a consequence of Γ = {ϕ1,ϕ2, . . .}, Γ |TML+ ξ , iff there is a closed tableau tree for (¬ξ : W ). If we take
Γ as the global assumption set, then all the formulas in it are taken as true sentences in every world in a model of TML+ .
In the following, we show how to construct a tableau tree to prove a logical consequence.
Example 1. In the following, the term {msg}k stands for message msg encrypted by key k. If we have the following global
assumptions:
(a) Ba secure(k),
(b) Ba secure(k) ∧ receive(a, {msg}k) ↔ Ba reliable(msg),
and the following local assumption:
(c) ﬁrst next receive(a, {msg}k),
J. Ma et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2011) 289–304 297then we can prove the following formula:
(d) ﬁrst next Ba reliable(msg).
Formally, we write:
{a,b} |TML+ {c} ⇒ ﬁrst next Ba reliable(msg)
To prove the conclusion (d), i.e., to prove that (d) is true at all those models in which formulas (a), (b) and (c) are true, we
use the tableau calculus. So, we ﬁrst assume that formula (d) is not true in one of those models (called the countermodel),
i.e., we assume that (¬d) is true at some world in the countermodel. Given all the global and local assumptions, if we
can show that all the branches of the tableau are closed, then this means that there are no countermodels and hence the
formula (d) follows from the assumptions.
The proof of (d) is given as follows.
1 ¬ﬁrst next Ba reliable(msg) : w0 [¬d]
2 ¬next Ba reliable(msg) : (t0,w0) [1T]
3 ¬Ba reliable(msg) : (t1, (t0,w0)) [2T]
4 ﬁrst next receive(a, {msg}k) : w0 [c]
5 next receive(a, {msg}k) : (t0,w0) [4T]
6 receive(a, {msg}k) : (t1, (t0,w0)) [5T]
7 Ba secure(k) : W0 [a]
8 Ba secure(k) ∧ receive(a, {msg}k) ↔ Ba reliable(msg) : W1 [b]
9 Ba secure(k) ∧ receive(a, {msg}k) → Ba reliable(msg) : W1 [8C]
10.1 ¬(Ba secure(k) ∧ receive(a, {msg}k) : W1) [9D]
10.2 Ba reliable(msg) : W1 [9D]
11 × {10.2/3}
12.1 ¬Ba secure(k) : W1 [10.1D]
12.2 ¬receive(a, {msg}k) : W1 [10.1D]
13 × {12.1/7}
14 × {12.2/6}
In the ﬁrst step of the proof, we assume (¬d) is true at world w0 ∈ C in some model. We label the corresponding node
by w0 (again, a speciﬁc world from which the observation is assumed to be made). In the proof process, when we introduce
a local assumption, we also label it by w0; when we introduce a global assumption we label it by a variable, W1 ∈ V . Note
that, formula (c) is a global assumption which is assumed to be true at any world, so we use the label W1. So, the nodes
10.1, 10.2 are all with the label W1.
In this tableau, the labelled formulas in the nodes 10.2 and 3 are complementary; in other words, the formulas them-
selves can be uniﬁed with respect to standard ﬁrst-order uniﬁcation, as well as their labels but with respect to σTML+ . In
fact, [W1, (t1, (t0,w0))]ρσTML+ holds where the label uniﬁer is ρ = {W1/(t1, (t0,w0))}. The same is also true for the nodes
12.1 and 7, as well as the nodes 12.2 and 6. There are three branches and all of them are closed, therefore, we conclude
that the formula d follows from the given global and local assumptions.
4.4. Proof search
By following the proof search method for canonical trees [4] and the ﬁbred belief logic FL [41], we propose the following
general proof search method for the tableau calculus.
Let Γ = {ϕ1,ϕ2, . . . , ϕn} be a set of formulas of TML+. In practice, ϕ1 is the negation of the formula we want to prove
from the given set of assumptions {ϕ2, . . . , ϕn}. We can construct a tableau tree T for Γ incrementally if there exists a
ﬁnite sequence (T1,T2, . . . ,Tn) of tableau trees such that:
• T1 is a 1-branch tree consisting of the nodes {ϕ1 : u1,ϕ2 : u2, . . . , ϕn : un} where ui is the label corresponding to the
formula ϕi ;
• Tn =T ; and
• for each 0< i < n, Ti+1 results from Ti by an application of an inference rule of the labelled tableau system.
The tableau tree will have branches when one of the disjunctive rules or the bivalence rule is applied at any given node.
All the formulas occurring on a branch are candidates for expansion provided that there is a corresponding tableau inference
rule which can still be applied. Once all the corresponding rules have been exhausted, we say that all the formulas on the
branch have been analysed. Once that happens, we say that the branch is completed. When all the branches of a tableau
tree have been completed, we say that the tableau tree is completed.
298 J. Ma et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2011) 289–304The proof search procedure starts from the 1-branch tree T1 consisting of {ϕ1 : u1, . . . , ϕn : un} and applies the inference
rules of the labelled tableau system until the resulting tableau tree is either closed or completed. The inference rules are
applied in a particular order so that only canonical tableau trees are generated during proof search. A TML+ tableau tree is
called canonical if and only if all the applications of the zero-premise rules come before the applications of the one-premise
rules, and all the applications of one-premise rules come before the applications of the two-premise rules.
An important property of canonical TML+ trees is that:
A canonical TML+ tree always terminates, since each formula has a ﬁnite number of subformulas and the number of
labels which can occur in the tree is limited by the number of modal and temporal operators appearing in a given
formula. For the details of the proof of canonical tree termination, we refer the readers to [37].
4.5. Soundness and completeness
This section discusses the soundness and completeness of the labelled tableau calculus. We show that our labelled
tableau calculus is sound and complete for all the logics, SLTL, TML and TML+ . Since the labelled tableau calculus we adopt
is in fact KEM [21,2], its soundness and completeness for SLTL and TML follow from the analogous results reported in the
literature for the ﬁbred belief logic FL of SLTL and TML (see Lemmas 1 and 2 of Orgun et al. [41]). Armed with these results,
we ﬁrst prove the soundness and completeness of the labelled tableau calculus for TML+ .
Theorem 1. The labelled tableau system for TML+ is sound.
Proof. Soundness means that if a formula ϕ is provable by the tableau method, then ϕ is valid. Let T be a closed tableau
with origin ¬ϕ : W , and let v be any model. Since T is closed, each branch contains some formula and its negation, and
therefore T cannot be true under v . That is, the origin of T is false under v , thus ϕ : W is true. Since v was arbitrary, it
follows that ϕ is valid. The soundness of the inference rules is standard; we omit the proofs. 
In order to obtain the completeness of the tableau system for TML+ , we ﬁrst provide the following lemma which shows
that any formula of TML+ can be transformed into conjunctive normal form. We have introduced the concept of monolithic
formulas of TML before: we say that ϕ is a monolithic formula in TML, if it does not contain any logical connectives or
quantiﬁers. Recall that the set of all the monolithic formulas of TML is denoted by L (m)tml .
Lemma 2. For any TML+ formula ϕ , we can express ϕ in the following form by transformation into conjunctive normal form (CNF):
(
11ψ11 ∨ · · · ∨ 
1k1ψ1k1) ∧ · · · ∧ (
n1ψn1 ∨ · · · ∨ 
nknψnkn)
where n,k1, . . . ,kn  1, each ψi j is a monolithic formula or the negation of a monolithic formula in TML, and 
i j is a sequence of
temporal operators, which may be empty. We call the above formula an n-∧ formula, and (
i1ψi1 ∨ · · · ∨ 
ikiψiki ) (i = 1, . . . ,n)
a ki-
 formula. In general, we call (
1ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ 
kψk) a k-
 formula and 
iψi a temporal monolithic formula.
Proof. All the temporal and belief operators can be distributed over the logical connectives and the quantiﬁers by using the
axioms of TML+ . Then the resulting formula can then be transformed into CNF in a standard way. Note that all the free
variables in the CNF formula are assumed to be universally quantiﬁed. 
We now discuss the completeness of the labelled tableau. Again, Orgun et al. [41] showed the completeness of the
tableau system for FL which subsumes the tableau system for TML+ and hence the completeness of the labelled tableau is
implied by their analogous results. We will instead leverage Lemma 2 above to give the sketch of an alternative proof to
reveal a complete clausal resolution method for TML+ .
Theorem 3. The labelled tableau for TML+ is complete.
Proof. Tableau completeness means that if a TML+ formula ϕ is valid, then ϕ is provable by the tableau calculus. According
to Lemma 2, we only need to prove the following assertion:
If ϕ is valid, then the n-∧ formula corresponding to ¬ϕ has a tableau proof.
We can prove this assertion by structural induction. The main idea is that closed tableau proofs of SLTL formulas and TML
formulas can be extended to closed tableau proofs of TML+ formulas by following their structure in the n-∧ formula, and
by manipulating their labels if necessary in the case of applications of the rules of inference for temporal operators. 
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Without going into technical details, we now sketch the resolution method below. As resolution is also a refutation-based
proof procedure, the assumptions in a given theory and the negation of a conclusion from it can be transformed into a set
of n-∧ formulas, that is, a set of clauses. Each clause can be labelled by a world variable, say W , in the beginning:
(
1ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ 
mψm) : W
We may then distribute the label W to all the temporal monolithic formulas in the clause:

1ψ1 : W ∨ · · · ∨ 
mψm : W
Every temporal monolithic formula 
iψi can be transformed into a labelled literal of the form ψi : Wi where ψi is either a
positive or a negative literal (monolithic formula) and Wi is the new label obtained from W by the applications of (T) rules
for the temporal operators in 
i .
ψ1 : W1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm : Wm
The only rule of inference we need is the following resolution rule which can be applied to clauses of labelled literals:
φ1 : u1 ∨ · · · ∨ φm : um, ψ1 : v1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψn : vn
(φ1 : u1ρ ∨ · · · ∨ φi−1 : ui−1ρ ∨ φi+1 : ui+1ρ ∨ · · · ∨ φm : umρ ∨ ψ1 : v1ρ ∨ · · · ∨ ψ j−1 : v j−1ρ ∨ ψ j+1 : v j+1ρ ∨ · · · ∨ ψn : vnρ)θ
(R)
where φi and ψ j are complementary formulas with the most general uniﬁer θ and labels ui and v j can be uniﬁed with the
label uniﬁer ρ , that is, [ui, v j]ρσTML+ holds. The uniﬁer θ needs to be applied to all the literals while ρ to all the labels in
each labelled literal.
Once we have a set of clauses of labelled literals corresponding to the n-∧ formulas, we can apply the resolution method
to those pairs of complementary literals in those clauses from different nodes in search of a contradiction. We now give an
example resolution proof below.
Example 2. Consider Example 1 given earlier where we need to show:
{a,b} |TML+ {c} ⇒ ﬁrst next Ba reliable(msg)
To prove the formula (d) (the conclusion), we ﬁrst need to transform the global and local assumptions and the negation
of the conclusion to n-∧ formulas ﬁrst and then to clauses of labelled positive monolithic literals and labelled negative
monolithic literals as shown below:
1 Ba secure(k) : W0 [a]
2a ¬Ba secure(k) : W1 ∨ ¬receive(a, {msg}k) : W1 ∨ Ba reliable(msg) : W1 [b]
2b Ba secure(k) : W2 ∨ ¬Ba reliable(msg) : W2 [b]
2c receive(a, {msg}k) : W3 ∨ ¬Ba reliable(msg) : W3 [b]
3 ﬁrst next receive(a, {msg}k) : w0 [c]
4 ¬ﬁrst next Ba reliable(msg) : w0 [¬d]
The formulas in the steps 2a, 2b, 2c are obtained from the n-∧ formula corresponding to formula (b) (we omit the details).
Now formulas in steps 3 and 4 will each be transformed to a labelled literal as follows:
5 next receive(a, {msg}k) : (t0,w0) [3T]
6 receive(a, {msg}k) : (t1, (t0,w0)) [5T]
7 ¬next Ba reliable(msg) : (t0,w0) [4T]
8 ¬Ba reliable(msg) : (t1, (t0,w0)) [7T]
and then the resolution method is applied to the set {1,2a,2b,2c,6,8} of clauses to derive a contradiction; we omit the
details.
9 ¬Ba secure(k) : (t1, (t0,w0)) ∨ ¬receive(a, {msg}k) : (t1, (t0,w0)) [2a/8 R]
10 ¬Ba secure(k) : (t1, (t0,w0)) [6/9 R]
11 × [1/10 R]
We have derived a contradiction, hence the conclusion follows from the given set of assumptions. Such a resolution method
complements the tableau system and it may be considered in future work.
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In our previous work [36], we have presented a generic method for establishing trust theories for communication pro-
tocols, together with several worked examples for security protocols such as Kerberos, Needham–Schroeder Symmetric Key
Protocol and Wide-Mouthed Frog. In this section we present two further examples to show how to reason about agent
beliefs using the labelled tableau system.
Example 3 (Simple communication protocol). Communication protocols deﬁne the rules for sending blocks of data from one
agent to another agent in a network. Communication protocols have many features to ensure reliable data exchanged over
communication channels.
Assume that we have the following global assumptions:
(a) expired(K ) → BX expired(K ).
Strictly speaking, the syntax of TML+ does not allow for a variable in a belief operator. We use the notation BX to have
a compact representation of this property for any given agent i. In other words, if there are n agents, then there are n
instances of the formula where each formula is of the form expired(K ) → Bi expired(K ).
(b) BX expired(K ) ∧ receive(X, {M}k) → next BX unreliable(M).
Similarly, if there are n agents, then there are n instances of the formula where each formula is of the form
Bi expired(K ) ∧ receive(i, {M}k) → next Bi unreliable(M).
In addition, we have the following local assumptions:
(c) expired(k).
(d) receive(a, {m}k).
Then we can prove the following formula:
(e) next Ba unreliable(m).
That is, with the assumptions that (a) if an encryption key is expired, then the agents know it is expired; (b) if an agent
believes a key is expired, and receives a message which is encrypted by the key, then at the next moment in time, the agent
believes the message is unreliable; (c) key k is expired; (d) agent a receives a message m which is encrypted by key k; then
we can prove that (e) at the next moment in time, agent a believes that the message m is unreliable.
The proof is given as follows.
1 ¬next Ba unreliable(m) : w0 [¬e]
2 expired(k) : w0 [c]
3 receive(a, {m}k) : w0 [d]
4 expired(K ) → Ba expired(K ) : W1 [a]
5 Ba expired(K ) ∧ receive(a, {M}k) → next Ba unreliable(M) : W2 [b]
6 Ba expired(k) ∧ receive(a, {m}k) → next Ba unreliable(m) : W2 [5Q]
7.1 ¬(Ba expired(k) ∧ receive(x, {m}k)) : W2 [6D]
7.2 next Ba unreliable(m) : W2 [6D]
8 × {7.2/1}
9 ¬Ba expired(k) : W2 [7.1D]
10 ¬receive(x, {m}k) : W2 [7.1D]
11 × {10/3}
12.1 ¬expired(k) : W1 [4D]
12.2 Ba expired(k) : W1 [4D]
13 × {12.1/2}
14 × {12.2/9}
In this tableau, since a is assumed to be one of the agents in the system, nodes 4 and 5 are instances of formulas (a) and
(b) respectively where X is replaced by a; node 6 is obtained from node 5 by simultaneous substitution of the constants k
and m for variables K and M (to save space); node 8 is obtained by nodes 7.2 and 1 with the label uniﬁer {W2/w0}; node
11 is obtained by nodes 10 and 3 with the uniﬁer {W2/w0}; node 13 is obtained by nodes 12.1 and 2 with the uniﬁer
{W1/w0}; node 14 is obtained by nodes 12.2 and 9 with the uniﬁer {W1/W2}. All the branches of the tableau tree have
been closed, so we have proved the formula (e).
Example 4 (Bit transmission protocol). A bit transmission protocol involves two agents, a sender S , and a receiver R , a simple
protocol can be started as follows: Initially, S sends a bit to R , and continues to do so till it receives an acknowledgement
from R . R sends an acknowledgement to S if it receives a bit.
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(a) next receive(S,Ack) → receive(R,Bit).
(b) receive(R,Bit) ∧ (Bit = N) → BR (Bit = n).
This formula too represents n instances where R is replaced by an agent.
(c) send(S,Bit) ∧ ¬next receive(S,Ack) → next next send(S,Bit).
Moreover, we have the following local assumptions:
(d) next receive(s,ack).
(e) bit = n.
Then we can prove the following formula:
(f) BsBr(bit = n).
That is, with the assumptions (a) if the sender receives an acknowledgement, then the receiver must have received the
bit; (b) the receiver knows that the value of the received bit; (c) if the sender sends a bit, and the bit is not subsequently
received, then the sender will re-send the bit; (d) the sender receives an acknowledgement ack; (e) the value of the received
bit is n; then we can prove that (f) the sender believes that the receiver believes that the value of the received bit is n.
The proof is given as follows.
1 ¬BsBr(bit = n) : w0 [¬f]
2 next receive(s,ack) : w0 [d]
3 bit = n : w0 [e]
4 next receive(S,Ack) → receive(R,Bit) : W1 [a]
5 receive(r,Bit) ∧ (Bit = N) → Br (Bit = n) : W2 [b]
6 receive(r,bit) ∧ (bit = n) → Br (bit = n) : W2 [5Q]
7.1 ¬(receive(r,bit) ∧ (bit = n)) : W2 [6D]
7.2 Br (bit = n) : W2 [6D]
8 ¬Br (bit = n) : (Wsi ,w0) [1B]
9 × {8/7.2}
10 ¬receive(r,bit) : W2 [7.1D]
11 ¬(bit = n) : W2 [7.1D]
12 × {11/3}
13 next receive(s,ack) → receive(r,bit) : W1 [4Q]
14.1 ¬next receive(s,ack) : W1 [13D]
14.2 receive(r,bit) : W1 [13D]
15 × {14.1/2}
16 × {14.2/10}
In this tableau, node 6 is obtained from node 5 by simultaneous substitution of the constants bit and n for variables
Bit and N (to save space); node 13 is obtained from node 4 in a similar fashion; node 9 is obtained by nodes 8 and 7.2
with the uniﬁer {W2/(Wsi ,w0)}; node 12 is obtained by nodes 11 and 3 with the uniﬁer {W2/w0}; node 15 is obtained
by nodes 14.1 and 2 with the uniﬁer {W1/w0}; node 17 is obtained by nodes 14.2 and 10 with the uniﬁer {W1/W2}. This
tree has all the branches closed, so we have proved that the formula (f) follows from the given set of assumptions.
6. Model checking
This section outlines a model checking method for TML+ that complements our work on tableau. Model checking is used
for checking whether a given structure is a model of a given logical formula. For temporalised logics, Franceschet et al. [16]
proposed a model checking procedure which uses the model checkers of the component logics. We adopt their approach to
provide a model checker for the temporalised belief logic TML+ .
Let T be a temporal logic, L be an arbitrary logic, and TL be the combined logic. The main idea here is that, to check
whether a formula ϕ of a temporalised logic TL is satisﬁed in a TL model, we consider the set of the corresponding mono-
lithic subformulas of ϕ in the logic L. If we can determine the values of all the monolithic formulas in the corresponding L
model, then we will determine the truth value of ϕ in the TL model.
A TML+ model Mtml+ is a quadruple Mtml+ = 〈ck,K +,<, v〉. Let M be a ﬁnite TML+ model, and ϕ a TML+ formula.
We need to check whether there exists a state t ∈ ck such that M , t |tml+ ϕ . Let Max(ϕ) be the set of maximal TML
monolithic subformulas of ϕ , and ϕˆ be an SLTL formula obtained from ϕ by substituting every formula α ∈ Max(ϕ) by a
new proposition letter p.
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1. ξ ∧ Ba ψ ,
2. ξ ,
3. Ba ψ ,
4. ψ .
Here formula 1 is not a monolithic formula; formula 4 is a monolithic formula, but it is not a maximal monolithic formula,
because it is a subformula of formula 3. Therefore the set of maximal monolithic subformulas of ϕ is:
Max(ϕ) = {ξ,Baψ}
By replacing ξ and Baψ by new propositional letters p and q respectively, we obtain an SLTL formula:
ϕˆ = ﬁrst next(p ∧ q)
Let MCTML , MCSLTL , and MCTML+ be the model checkers for the logics TML, SLTL and TML
+ , respectively. Given a model
checking instance, these programs will return a corresponding truth value. The model checkers MCTML and MCSLTL can be
used to develop a model checker for TML+ in an intuitive way as follows.
Function MCTML+
Input: a TML+ model M = 〈ck,K +,<, v〉 and a TML+ formula ϕ .
Output: true if M | ϕ; false otherwise.
compute Max(ϕ) and ϕˆ
for every t ∈ ck
π(t) = ∅
endfor
for every α ∈ Max(ϕ)
for every t ∈ ck
if MCTML(v(t),α) = true
then π(t) = π(t) ∪ {pα}
endfor
endfor
return MCSLTL(〈ck,K +,<,π〉, ϕˆ).
Given a TML+ model and TML+ formula, MCTML+ computes the set Max(ϕ) and the formula ϕˆ ﬁrst. Then for every
moment t ∈ ck, it initializes a valuation function π to the empty set. Furthermore for every maximal monolithic formula
α ∈ Max(ϕ) and every moment t ∈ ck, it invokes the model checker MCTML on the input consisting of the TML model π(t)
and the TML formula α. If the execution of MCTML on t and α returns true, then the propositional letter pα corresponding
to α is added to π(t). Finally, MCTML+ calls the model checker MCSLTL on the input consisting of the SLTL model and the
SLTL formula ϕˆ , and it returns the output.
With a ﬁnite TML+ model M and a TML+ formula ϕ as input, the function MCTML+ has the following properties:
• Termination: MCTML+ returns either true or false.• Soundness: If MCTML+ returns true, then for an existing t ∈ ck, MTML+ , t | ϕ .• Completeness: If MCTML+ returns false, then for every t ∈ ck, MTML+ , t | ϕ .
We leave the development of the proof of these properties and of the model checking procedure for future work. Note
that the ﬁniteness of the clock ck in the TML+ model M is necessary for the termination of the model checking procedure.
7. Conclusions
Combining logics is emerging as an active research area in logic and formal methods, with potential applications in many
diverse areas such as multi-agent systems, distributed systems and security protocols. As an example, this paper discussed
how to obtain a new logic by temporalising TML with TLC (resulting in TML+). This kind of a combination technique can be
seen as a hierarchy combination technique (by plussing one logic onto the other). Although it imposes certain restrictions on
the combined logic, there are several advantages with the hierarchy combination technique. We have a standardised pattern
for deﬁning the syntax; the semantics of the combined logic is deﬁned by the standard possible-world semantics approach;
and the proof system for any combined logic can be obtained from those of the two component logics.
We have presented a sound and complete labelled tableau proof system for TML+ which was obtained from the proof
systems of the constituent logics. This system is capable of representing the notion of evolving beliefs in TML+ in an
intuitive way. The labelled tableau system is closely related with modal logics, especially with the concept of possible worlds
J. Ma et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2011) 289–304 303and Kripke semantics. The basic idea of the labelled tableau system is to show an inconsistency of a formula by failure of a
systematic model construction process. We have shown several examples of tableau proofs where certain desired properties
of communication protocols have been established as theories of trust.
In future work, we plan to investigate reasoning techniques for agent beliefs in applications of agent-based systems
other than communication protocols such as agent negotiation. In order to complement the tableau system, we also plan to
develop model checkers for TML and SLTL, and then use them to develop a model checker for TML+ following the model
checking algorithm given above. We will also investigate the suitability of the existing model checkers such as NuSMV
[11] and SPIN [6], both of which support linear temporal logic (LTL) model checking. Furthermore, we plan to investigate
combinations of different logics of belief and time for constructing trust theories for authentication protocols, as well as
other methods for combining logics such as ﬁbring [17], fusion [25] and products [18]. We could then investigate whether
the combined systems would provide more expressive theories for describing, and reasoning about, security properties
within trusted agent-based systems.
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